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Comment

The Mixed-Motives Defense in Workplace
Discrimination Actions and Its Procedural
Issues in the Eleventh Circuit

I.

INTRODUCTION

Being fired from one's place of employment is an unfortunate incident
that many Americans face on one or more occasions during their
lifetimes. Discharged employees obviously experience some degree of
economic loss by losing salaries and benefits. Even when rightfully
discharged, employees may suffer emotional and psychological harm
because of their perceived failure. This harm may be magnified when
the employee has been discharged for wrongful, illegal reasons.
However, in some cases an employer may have legitimate, legal
reasons to terminate an employee and simultaneously have illegal,
discriminatory reasons. In such a "mixed-motives" situation, employers
may be able to limit their liability or avoid liability altogether. This
Comment discusses federal legislation promulgated to deter workplace
discrimination and the background of the mixed-motives defense. In
addition, it examines certain procedural issues and the nature of the
mixed-motives defense in the Eleventh Circuit.
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CONSIDERATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW

A. FederalLegislation
Congress has promulgated federal legislation to protect employees'
rights and to deter workplace discrimination. Employees who believe
that they have been discharged for illegal, discriminatory reasons
generally have the option of basing their actions on one or more federal
statutes.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 ("Title VII") provides that
employers, in both the private and public sectors, cannot "fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 In addition, an employer
may not "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. " '
Congress responded to age and disability discrimination in the
workplace by enacting both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA) 4 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"). 5 The ADEA provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's age."6 The ADA provides that covered entities are prohibited from discriminating "against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."7
In addition, employees in the public sector may also be able to include
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a basis for their actions. Section 1983 prohibits

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 1999).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
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employers acting under the authority of state or federal law from using
their authority to deprive employees of federally guaranteed rights.
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States...
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured .... 8
Another avenue to pursue damages in both the private and public
sectors is 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which secures an employee's right to enter
into contracts without discrimination based on race or ancestry. Section
1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.9
Nevertheless, workplace discrimination resulting in employee discharge
is commonplace in American society, and this discrimination has created
much legislation and court cases protecting employees from unfair labor
decisions. There are, however, means that exist by which an employer
is completely shielded from liability or is protected from unlimited
employee damage awards.
B.

Mixed-Motives Cases

Over twenty years ago, the courts began to address situations in which
an employee was discharged for both legal and illegal reasons. In Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle,1" an untenured teacher lost his job because the school district did not renew his
employment contract. Fred Doyle taught for the school board under oneyear contracts during his first two years and under two-year contracts
thereafter. Eventually, the school board decided it did not want to
rehire Doyle to teach in its district. The school board considered several
factors in deciding not to renew Doyle's employment contract. The
school board argued that during Doyle's employment, he (1) was involved

8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).

10. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

748

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

in an argument with another teacher that resulted in the other teacher
slapping Doyle, and Doyle refused to accept an apology; (2) was involved
in an argument with school cafeteria employees over the size of his
serving; (3) referred to students as "sons of bitches"; (4) made an obscene
gesture to two female students who did not obey his instructions when
he was supervising the cafeteria; and (5) telephoned a local radio station
to criticize a school memorandum regarding the faculty dress code.1'
After the school board determined that it would not rehire Doyle,
Doyle requested that the school board explain its decision.'" The school
board's response was a statement that Doyle demonstrated "a notable
lack of tact in handling professional matters." 3 The school board's
statement also specifically mentioned Doyle's conversation with the radio
station and his use 14of obscene gestures directed at students as reasons
for his termination.

Doyle sued the school board, arguing that the telephone call to the
radio station was protected by the First Amendment and that the
decision not to rehire him violated his First Amendment right to free
speech. 5 Both the district and the circuit courts found that the First16
Amendment protected Doyle's conversation with the radio station.
The Supreme Court agreed that the burden was properly placed upon
Doyle to prove that the conversation was protected speech and that the
conversation was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the decision
not to rehire him.' 7 However, the Court remanded the proceedings to
determine whether the school board could have shown by a preponderance of the evidence that "it would have reached the same decision as to
[Doyle's] reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.""
In effect, the Court in Mt. Healthy provided a complete defense to section
1983 violations when the employer proves that the same decision to fire
the employee would have been reached for legally permissible reasons. 9
The mixed-motives defense arose again in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,20 which involved a claim of discrimination based on a statute
rather than the Constitution. Hopkins, a female senior manager for

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 283 n.1.
Id.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 285-86.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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Price Waterhouse, was nominated for partnership in 1982.21 Hopkins
had worked for Price Waterhouse in its Washington, D.C., Office of
Government Services for five years. At that time only 7 of the firm's 662
partners were women. Hopkins was the only woman nominated for
partnership in a group of eighty-eight nominees that year. Upon
evaluation the company decided neither to offer nor deny her admission
to the partnership. Her nomination for partnership was suspended for
reconsideration the following year. However, the partners in her office
22
decided to withdraw their support before her candidacy was reviewed.
Hopkins sued Price Waterhouse, alleging that the partners violated
Title VII ,by discriminating against her on the basis of sex when
considering her for partnership. Hopkins offered evidence of her
impressive accomplishments as senior manager. She had assisted in
securing a $25 million contract and received praise for her "outstanding
performance" that was carried out "virtually at the partner level." In
addition, Hopkins presented evidence that many of the partners had
praised her efforts in the past with words including "professional" and
"extremely competent." Furthermore, the trial court judge determined
that none of the other employees nominated for partnership had
comparable
accomplishments regarding securing large contracts for the
23
company.
Hopkins also produced evidence that some of the partners had
negative reactions to her personality because of her sex. Some of the
employees referred to Hopkins as "macho" and objected to her use of foul
language because they deemed it to be unbecoming of a woman.
However, the evidence also indicated that Hopkins was often abrasive
and difficult to work with. Hopkins had been described as universally
disliked, annoying, and irritating.24

The trial court found that Price Waterhouse had indeed violated Title
VII by discriminating against Hopkins on the basis of sex. The court
noted that Price Waterhouse could have avoided equitable relief if it had
proven by clear and convincing evidence that Hopkins's partnership
candidacy would have been suspended even absent the gender discrimi-

21. Id. at 231-33. To be considered for partnership at Price Waterhouse when this
litigation commenced, the partners in the local office had to submit the candidate's name.
At that point, the existing partners could comment on the candidate's performance, and an
Admissions Committee would make a recommendation to the Policy Board. The
recommendation could have been to offer or deny a partnership position or to hold the
candidacy for review the following year. Id. at 232.
22. Id. at 233 & n.1.
23. Id. at 233-34.

24. Id. at 234-35.
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nation. The court determined that Price Waterhouse had not met this
burden.2 5
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's general conclusion, but
determined that the employer could avoid all liability, not just equitable
relief, if it could prove the same decision would have been made absent
the discrimination.2" The Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals approach, but disagreed with the standard of proof.27 The
appropriate standard, according to the Court, was a preponderance of
the evidence.2" Therefore, through this affirmative defense,29 an
employer may avoid liability altogether when legal and illegal reasons
for termination coexist and when the employer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have been made
absent the unlawful discrimination.3 0
In response to Price Waterhouse and other cases, Congress amended
Title VII in 1991 to allow a plaintiff to recover declaratory and
injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs, but not relief related to the
loss of an employee's position, in mixed-motives situations.3' Statutory
unlawful employment practices are established when an employee can
show that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for the employment practice, "even though other factors also
motivated the practice." 2 When a plaintiff can demonstrate a Title VII
violation by proving an unlawful employment practice, the defendant
still has an opportunity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor."3 In this event the court "may grant
declaratory relief, injunctive relief ...and attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable" to the claim. 4 However, the
court "shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment."3"

25. Id. at 237.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 258.
29. The Court examined the burdens on both parties and subsequently deemed the
employer's burden to be an affirmative defense. Id. at 246.
30. Id. at 258.
31. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)).
32. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
33. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(3)(B).
34. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(3)(B)(i).
35. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(3)(B)(ii).
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The Supreme Court recently revisited the mixed-motives defense in a
nonworkplace situation in Texas v. Lesage.3" Francois Lesage, a white
male, unsuccessfully applied for admission to the Ph.D: program in
counseling psychology in the Department of Education at the University
of Texas. Lesage's application was 1 of 223 that the school received for
the 1996-1997 academic year. These prospective students were
competing for about twenty seats.37 During the selection process, the
school "considered the race of its applicants at some stage during the
review process." 8 After Lesage received notification that his application was rejected, he filed a lawsuit alleging that the school violated
section 1981, section 1983, and Title VII by "establishing and maintaining a race-conscious admissions process." 9
The school moved for summary judgment and offered evidence that
Lesage's application would not have been selected for admission because
many of the applicants had superior qualifications. Eighty applicants
had superior undergraduate grades, almost twice that number had
higher Graduate Record Examination scores, and seventy-three
applicants were superior with respect to both factors. In addition, a
member of the admissions committee stated that Lesage had substandard letters of recommendations. Also, Lesage's personal statement
indicated that he possessed only a limited capacity to communicate his
interests and ideas. One member of the admissions committee testified
in an affidavit that these factors alone led to an early rejection of
Lesage's application. 4
The district court granted summary judgment for the school because
racial considerations did not have an effect on Lesage's rejection, and the
uncontested evidence indicated that the students who were accepted had
credentials that the admissions committee considered to be superior to
Lesage's. 4
Lesage appealed, and the circuit court dismissed the district court's
conclusion that the school would have rejected Lesage's application even
if there had been no racial considerations. The court reasoned that
Lesage was unable to compete on an equal footing and had suffered an
"implied injury" because of the racial considerations. The factual dispute
concerning whether there were any racial considerations involved in the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

120 S. Ct. 467 (1999).
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467-68.
Id. at 468.
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application review process was sufficient to render summary judgment
inappropriate. Therefore, the circuit court reversed and remanded.42
The Supreme Court determined that the circuit court's decision
concerning the section 1983 action was inconsistent with the wellestablished framework of Mt. Healthy.4" That the Court's previous
decisions on this damages issue under section 1983 for past injury
usually involved retaliation for exercising First Amendment rights, as
opposed to racial discrimination, was immaterial to the analysis.44 The
basic premise is that "where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is
undisputed that the government would have made the same decision
regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under
§ 1983." 4' Therefore, the State was entitled to summary judgment on
the section 1983 claim and the Court reversed on that issue.4
C. The Impact of the Mixed-Motives Affirmative Defense on
DiscriminationClaims
The mixed-motives defense can obviously be a good friend to employers. In many cases it completely abrogates an employee's right to
damages when an employer is guilty of some degree of illegal discrimination. This result leaves no remedy to an employee who suffers economic
and psychological harm resulting from being fired for at least partly
discriminatory reasons. The defense thus undermines the remedial
purposes of the legislation that purports to protect minorities from the
detrimental effects of unlawful discrimination.
Although the defense potentially allows entities to avoid remedial
orders for illegal discrimination, it provides the most workable result
under the current state of discrimination law. If the mixed-motives
defense did not exist, it would be virtually impossible for an employer to
terminate employees in a protected class without risking the serious
threat of costly, time-consuming lawsuits and devastating financial
liability, regardless of how unproductive or disruptive the employee
became. Unfortunately for some, there must be a method of safeguarding employers from a floodwater of litigation and liability. Therefore,
the bar that an employee must hurdle has to be set at some height, and
the current level is a preponderance of the evidence of illegal motive.
However, even if this hurdle is overcome, the employer may still avoid

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
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liability if it can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it had one
lawful, decisive motive.
III.

FEDERAL PROCEDURAL ISSUES PRESENT IN THE MIXED-MOTIVES
DEFENSE

Wrongful discharge cases bring up several procedural issues that may
affect an attorney's tactics in drafting pleadings, presenting evidence at
trial, drafting the pretrial order, and requesting jury instructions. As
discussed earlier, the mixed-motives defense has been referred to as an
affirmative defense, requiring the employer to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that at least one lawful reason was present in the
decision to terminate the employee and that the same decision would
have been made based on that reason even absent the discriminatory
factor."'
A.

Pleading

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party
answers a complaint, it must affirmatively plead defenses that constitute
avoidance or affirmative defenses.4" The purpose of Rule 8(c) is to
eliminate surprise by requiring adequate notice to the opposing parties
so as not to prejudice their position in the case.49
Although an affirmative defense is ordinarily deemed waived if it is
not asserted in a responsive pleading," other Rules may ameliorate
this harsh effect. A party is often able to obtain permission of the court
to amend the pleading, with such permission to be "freely given when
justice so requires. " " Another Rule that can salvage an initial waiver
is Rule 16, which provides that issues covered in pretrial conferences
that are present in the pretrial order control the course of action. 52 A
defendant who fails to plead an affirmative defense both initially and in
an amended answer may nevertheless use the pretrial order to put the
opposing party on notice that the defense will be utilized at trial.5 3

47. See supranotes 28-31; see also Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078,
1083 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. FED. R. CIv. P. 8(c). Specifically listed are "accord and satisfaction, arbitration and
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, [and] waiver." Id.
49. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
50. See Day v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 122 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1997).
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e).
53. See Hargett v. Valley Fed. Sav. Bank, 60 F.3d 754, 763 (11th Cir. 1995).
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B. Use of the PretrialOrder to Salvage the Defendant's Pleading
Waiver
Although the mixed-motives defense has been referred to as an
affirmative defense, some decisions have relaxed the procedural
requirements for its assertion. Consider how the mixed-motives defense
functioned in Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail.5 4 While working as
a correctional officer at the jail, Pulliam, a black male, filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC"), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for voicing his
complaints about such discrimination. Soon after officially filing the
charge with the EEOC, Pulliam was terminated. Pulliam then sued
Tallapoosa County for unlawful termination, alleging that the County
retaliated against him, in violation of Title VII and section 1981."
The County defended on the grounds that Pulliam was terminated for
the legitimate reason of poor work performance and that Pulliam's
EEOC charge was not a factor in the decision. The County produced
testimony and documentation regarding Pulliam's poor work record.
Pulliam attempted to prove that the County's reasons were merely a
pretext for a Title VII violation.5"
The trial court submitted special interrogatories to the jury asking if,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the County (1) fired Pulliam in
retaliation for the EEOC complaint that alleged discrimination and
retaliation; (2) considered the retaliation as a determining factor in the
decision to fire Pulliam; and (3) would have made the same decision to
fire Pulliam even if he had not filed the EEOC complaint. The jury
responded "yes" to each interrogatory, and the court entered judgment
for the County. 7
On appeal Pulliam argued that the County had failed to assert the
mixed-motives defense in its answer or at any time before the close of
evidence. The mixed-motives affirmative defense was thus waived,
according to Pulliam, and it was error for the court to submit the third
interrogatory to the jury.5" Although the County failed to plead the
affirmative defense, the court rejected this argument and determined

54. 185 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir. 1999).
55. Id. at 1183. Pulliam also named the jail, the jail administrator, a supervisor at the
jail, the county sheriff, and the county personnel board in the complaint, but Pulliam
dismissed those defendants and continued only against the County at trial. Id. at 1183 n. 1.
The retaliation claim was the only claim that went to the jury. Id. at 1183.
56. Id. at 1183-84.
57. Id. at 1184.
58. Id.
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that such an omission is not a complete waiver if the defense is included
in the pretrial order.59
The pretrial order did not specifically use the express term "mixedmotives affirmative defense." However, the district court determined
that the order discussed the County's position that Pulliam was
terminated because of his unsatisfactory employment record. The
district court concluded that the mention of Pulliam's poor work record
was sufficient warning that the County had properly asserted a mixedmotives defense. The court of appeals reviewed the district court's
interpretation of the pretrial order for abuse of discretion and was
unwilling to conclude that the court had in fact abused its discretion.'
The court of appeals noted that although the mixed-motives defense is
an affirmative defense that places the burden of proof on the defendant,
no previous Eleventh Circuit case had decided whether this defense must
be pleaded explicitly or if it could be implied."' The pretrial order
clearly warned that "it would be impossible to determine ...

whether

[the County's] retaliatory acts caused [Pulliam's] discharge without
considering [Pulliam's] own acts."62 Therefore, the County's motives for
terminating Pulliam were properly at issue and did not unfairly surprise
him.63
The court also determined that assertion of a mixed-motives defense
did not require the County to admit a discriminatory motive, even in the
alternative.' The burden is properly placed on the plaintiff to prove
that a discriminatory motive was a factor in the decision to terminate
the employee. 5 When the plaintiff presents evidence that a discriminatory motive was a motivating factor in the decision, the defendant can
(1) argue that the plaintiff failed to establish that the impermissible
reason was a motivating factor; (2) prove that the same action would
have been taken for solely legal reasons; or (3) take the second position
as an alternative to the first.66
In the Eleventh Circuit's view, defendant's argument that Pulliam was
fired for lawful reasons also supported the argument that the same
decision would have been made even had there also been evidence of
unlawful reasons for termination. 67 Therefore, the court did not find
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

1185.
1185 n.4.
1185.
1186.
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that the trial court abused its discretion in interpreting the pretrial
order.6"
Is this evidence that the mixed-motives defense is not treated like a
typical affirmative defense and is permitted to be implied by the
employer, or is there some other procedural explanation? One might
determine that this result was achieved because the Eleventh Circuit
applied Rule 16(e) in a relaxed manner. After all, the court determined
that although the pretrial order made no explicit mention of the use of
the mixed-motives affirmative defense, the language was sufficient to
imply that such a defense could be asserted at trial.6 9 However, the
court of appeals did not state that it subscribed to that interpretation of
the order, but merely that it was unwilling to overturn the district
court's interpretation as an abuse of discretion.7 °
However, there are also cases that would support the proposition that
the Eleventh Circuit interprets pretrial orders harshly. For example, in
Olmsted v. Taco Bell Corp.,71 a Taco Bell assistant manager, Olmsted,
observed apparent racial discrimination at his restaurant and reported
his observations to his superiors. Olmsted claimed that soon after he
made the complaint, Taco Bell supervisors began to treat him differently,
and he was eventually suspended.72
Olmsted filed suit against Taco Bell under Title VII and section 1981.
At trial, although Taco Bell argued that Olmsted's new manager knew
nothing about Olmsted's complaint of racial discrimination and was the
sole decisionmaker in the determination to discharge Olmsted, the jury
found for Olmsted. Olmsted received a judgment of $10,000 in back pay,
compensatory damages of $450,000, and punitive damages of $3
million.73
The district court, however, issued an order limiting the damages
award to the amount provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) for Title VII
actions.7 4 The district court determined that Olmsted, in the pretrial

68. Id. at 1187.
69. Id. at 1185.

70. Id.
71. 141 F.3d 1457 (11th Cir. 1998).
72. Id. at 1459.
73. Id. at 1459-60.
74. Id. at 1461. Section 1981a limits damages awards for Title VII violations
depending on the size of the company (the smaller the size of the company, the smaller the
amount of the cap). This section provides that, as to punitive damages and certain kinds

of compensatory damages, a company with more than 14, but fewer than 101 employees
cannot be liable for more than $50,000; a company with more than 100, but fewer than 201
employees cannot be liable for more than $100,000; a company with more than 200, but

fewer than 501 employees cannot be liable for more than $200,000; and a company with
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order, had abandoned his section 1981(a) claim that would have no
statutory cap on damages.
Upon review the court of appeals examined the pretrial order and
found that section 1981(a) was not specifically mentioned. 76 The
pretrial order mentioned the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended
both Title VII and section 1981, but only section 1981a was specifically
mentioned in the order, not section 1981(a).77 The court decided that
although it was "reluctant to engage in an overly technical reading of a
pleading when the dispositive factor is the apparent absence of a set 7of
parentheses, these parentheses unfortunately control our decision." 1
Although the court "appreciat[ed] the potential for confusion in pleading
causes of action based on both Title VII and § 1981, [it] believe[d] that
the district court acted within its discretionary authority in construing
the pretrial statement as evincing an abandonment of the § 1981
claim."79 Because the complaint correctly cited to section 1981 and
Title VII, the court assumed that "the drafter of both the complaint and
the pretrial stipulation knew the difference between the two statutory
avenues of relief."80
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Pulliam allowed a defendant to use
the affirmative defense and to receive jury instructions on it even absent
any specific reference to the defense in the pretrial order, effectively
allowing the same-decision affirmative defense to be implied.8 ' In
Olmsted the trial court reduced a jury award of $3,460,000 for plaintiff
to $300,000 because of the apparent omission a set of parentheses that
would have allowed unlimited damages.8 2
Would it not seem fair to assume that in Pulliam the employer knew
that the nature of an affirmative defense required it to be identified
clearly at some point prior to trial and that failure to do so could lead to
abandonment of that defense for failing to give adequate notice to the
opposing party? Although these results may seem difficult to reconcile,
it could also be argued that both are consistent with the policy of
providing sufficient notice to the opposing party as to pretrial stipulations because it is the trial court that is present throughout the entire
process. Instead of merely applying Rule 16(e) broadly, the Eleventh
more than 500 employees cannot be liable for more than $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
75. 141 F.3d at 1461.
76. Id. at 1462.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1463.
80. Id. at 1462.

81. 185 F.3d at 1185.
82. 141 F.3d at 1460, 1462.
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Circuit appears to give considerable deference to the trial court on this
Rule. The court of appeals allows these decisions to be made by the
district courts because trial judges have access to all the information and
are in the best position to make a ruling on the issue, which theoretically ensures sufficient notice to the opposing party and avoids unnecessary
and unjust surprise.
C. Evidence Offered at Trial and Jury Instructions
Other procedural issues that arise in mixed-motives employment
discrimination cases concern placement of the burden of persuasion,
types of evidence offered at trial, and how the jury is to be instructed.
Initially, the employee bears the burden of proving that the employer
had an unlawful reason that was a motivating factor in the decision to
discharge the employee."s Once such evidence has been presented, the
employer may (1) argue that the employee has failed to prove that an
illegal reason was a motivating factor, (2) present evidence and prove
that the employer would have arrived at the same decision to terminate
the employee in the absence of the illegal motivating factor, or (3) use
both approaches. 8
However, as in Pulliam, the employer is not required to admit that
any of its motives were discriminatory or unlawful to argue the mixedmotives affirmative defense.85 The employer is not even required to
argue in the alternative that even if there was an illegal motive, the
same decision would have been reached and the employee would have
been terminated in either situation.86
Thus, the employer may take full advantage of the affirmative defense
to limit liability while possibly avoiding the risk of alienating the jury
by admitting that discrimination may have been a factor. Even when
the employer denies the existence of any discriminatory or unlawful
motivating factor, the jury can still be instructed on the same-decision
affirmative defense. The employer fulfills the evidentiary requirements
necessary to warrant the same-decision instruction merely by presenting
evidence of a lawful factor sufficient by itself to explain the discharge.
As the Eleventh Circuit in Pulliam explained, even though it is improper
for "a court to instruct on a proposition of law about which there is no
evidence," a party is entitled to an instruction on "'the theory of the
defense, as long as it has some basis in the evidence and has legal

83.
84.
85.
86.

Pulliam, 185 F.3d at 1186.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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support.'"" In effect the jury is instructed on an affirmative defense
that the employer has never actually presented at trial. Of course, the
jury should be instructed that the burden of proof is on the employer to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there actually was at
least one lawful reason that would have led the employer to reach the
same decision independent of any unlawful reason."
Therefore, if an employer believes the employee has not met the
burden of proof by proving one unlawful motivating reason, the employer
can refrain from requesting the instruction and avoid accepting the
burden of proof on the same-decision issue. Conversely, if the employer
believes that the employee has met its burden of proof by establishing
an unlawful, discriminatory motivating factor, it has the option of
requesting the same-decision instruction to limit liability (in Title VII
cases) or to avoid liability for damages altogether (in section 1983 cases).
This is an issue to be resolved by evaluating the circumstances involved
ineach case.
If the employer opts not to request the instruction on the affirmative
defense, can the employee successfully request it to shift the burden?
After all, the evidence is apparently properly before the jury so that the
employer may request the instruction.
In Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos.,89 the Second Circuit
determined that a plaintiff was entitled to the burden-shifting instruction "where the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to find both
forbidden and permissible motives."' The evidence must be directly
connected to the unlawful discharge (statistical evidence and scattered
remarks by persons not involved in the decisionmaking process would be
insufficient to warrant the instruction).91 However, when the plaintiff
is entitled to the instruction, the "jury must be told that the mixedmotive issue does not arise unless it first determines that the plaintiff

87.

Id. at 1187 (quoting United States v. Morris, 20 F.3d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1994)).

88. To avoid liability altogether, the employer must show it would have made the same
decision based on what it knew at that time, not on what it learned later. McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 359-60 (1995). Interestingly, in Pulliam,when
the same-decision interrogatory was submitted to the jury, the court failed to instruct the
jury that the employer had the burden of proof for the affirmative defense. 185 F.3d at
1188. Although it was error, the court determined on appeal that not every error is
reversible error. Id. Because Pulliam failed to object to the instructions, Pulliam was
faced with overcoming the plain error doctrine's burden of proving that the error was "'so
fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting lervolino v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 796 F.2d 1408, 1414 (11th Cir. 1986)). The court did not determine that
"proper instructions would probably have altered the outcome." Id. at 1189.
89. 968 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1992).
90. Id. at 181.
91. Id. at 182.
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has carried the burden of proving a forbidden motive but has failed to
prove that the employer's explanations were pretextual."92 In Fields v.
New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities,93 plaintiff did not present any "'policy documents or statements of
a person involved in the decisionmaking process that reflect a discriminatory' intent," and, therefore, was not entitled to the instruction. 94
When the plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to be
entitled to the same-decision instruction, the defendant can cause the
burden of proof to remain on the plaintiff. In Pulliam, had the County
determined that it did not want to accept the burden of proof and had
it not requested the affirmative defense instruction, Pulliam should not
have been able to get the instruction to shift the burden to the County.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although in Pulliam the employer did not suffer adverse consequences
from failing to plead the mixed-motives affirmative defense and failing
to include it in the pretrial order, it is advisable to do both if the
defendant anticipates requesting the same-decision jury instruction. The
district court in Pulliam could have very easily interpreted the pretrial
order to preclude the use of the mixed-motives affirmative defense. An
employer that fails to include it at the proper juncture in the case is
taking that risk. The Eleventh Circuit seems likely to reverse the
district court's interpretation of the pretrial order only for abuse of
discretion, which is normally a difficult standard to prove.
RICHARD A. WELLER

92. Id. at 181.
93. 115 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 124 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 182); see also Thomas v. Denny's, Inc.,
111 F.3d 1506, 1512 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that "a plaintiff is entitled to a mixedmotives instruction upon a proper evidentiary showing even if the defendant does not
request one").

